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ALD-078          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3828 
 ___________ 
 
 CARMINE SAUCHELLI, 




 US POSTAL SERVICE;  
FRANK POSTORINO, Supervisor 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-01682) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 29, 2010 
 Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: January 14, 2011) 
 _________ 
 




 Carmine Sauchelli, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court‟s order denying 
his motion for summary judgment and granting the Postal Service‟s motion for summary 
judgment.  Also before the Court are Sauchelli‟s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 
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and motion for appointment of counsel.   
I 
 From 1987 until 2005, Sauchelli was employed as a letter carrier with the United 
States Postal Service.  Defendant-Appellee Frank Postorino became Sauchelli‟s 
supervisor in 2000.  Beginning in 2001, Postorino disciplined Sauchelli on several 
occasions, giving Sauchelli several warnings and suspending him at least twice.  
Sauchelli believed Postorino had singled him out for harassment, and a co-worker heard 
Postorino say:  “I don‟t care how long it takes me, but I will get Carmine.  He‟s sticking 
it to me and I will get him.”   
 In June 2004, Sauchelli received a notice of removal for “Failure to Properly 
Perform Your Duties.”  His union intervened, and, after the parties entered into a “Last 
Chance Agreement,” the notice of removal was held in abeyance for a two-year period.  
Thereafter, Sauchelli committed a handful of infractions, for which he received warnings 
from Postorino.  Then, in March 2005, Sauchelli received a second notice of removal, 
which alleged that he had violated the last chance agreement.  Sauchelli‟s union filed a 
grievance, but Sauchelli‟s termination was upheld. 
 Sauchelli then filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging that he suffered 
discrimination based on his disability (he has a back injury) and his sex (male).  His 
initial complaint was deemed meritless.  On appeal, the EEOC Office of Federal 
Operations affirmed the initial finding that no prohibited discrimination occurred. 
 In 2008, Sauchelli filed this complaint in the District Court, alleging that his 
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termination resulted from unlawful gender discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
1
  The thrust of his claim was that he 
was subjected to discipline for conduct that his female coworkers also committed, though 
without consequence.  Sauchelli also alleged that Frank Postorino created a hostile work 
environment based on Sauchelli‟s gender.  Each of the parties filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  The District Court denied Sauchelli‟s motion and granted the Postal Service‟s 
motion.  Sauchelli filed a timely notice of appeal from that order.  He also requests that 
we grant him in forma pauperis status and appoint counsel to represent him.  The Postal 
Service filed a motion requesting summary action, which Sauchelli opposes. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We turn first 
to Sauchelli‟s in forma pauperis motion.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), we may allow 
Sauchelli to proceed without prepayment of fees.  Our decision is based solely on 
Sauchelli‟s economic eligibility.  See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976).  
Based on Sauchelli‟s supporting affidavit, we will permit him to proceed in forma 
pauperis. 
 We may summarily affirm the District Court‟s order if Sauchelli‟s appeal does not 
raise a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 10.6.  “Our review of a 
district court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we must apply the same 
standard the district court was required to apply under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
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  In his deposition, Sauchelli explained that he no longer intended to pursue a disability 
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56(c).”  Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Thus, we can 
affirm only „if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‟”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).  “A 
genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the 
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”  Id.  “In evaluating the 
evidence, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
draw all inferences in that party's favor.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
 When direct evidence of discrimination is unavailable, a plaintiff alleging “reverse 
discrimination” in a Title VII action makes out a prima facie case “by presenting 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude (given the totality of the 
circumstances) that the defendant treated [him] „less favorably than others because of 
[his] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‟”  Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 
163 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).  
Likewise, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment claim under Title VII must 
demonstrate that he suffered discrimination on account of his sex.  See Huston v. Procter 
& Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009).  Here, the District Court 
reasoned that Sauchelli‟s disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims 
necessarily failed because Sauchelli did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable 




fact finder to conclude that any adverse actions taken against Sauchelli were on account 
of his sex.  We agree. 
 Sauchelli asserts that he was disciplined for certain conduct but that his female 
coworkers were not necessarily disciplined for the same conduct.  However, as the 
District Court explained, the record shows that both male and female employees received 
discipline, in various forms, for infractions of the Postal Service‟s rules.  And although 
Sauchelli was the only employee -- male or female -- who was terminated for infractions, 
he was also the only employee who violated a Last Chance Agreement.
2
  In short, 
Sauchelli did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that 
he was treated less favorably than others based on his gender.    
 Accordingly, we will grant the Defendant-Appellees‟ motion and summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Sauchelli‟s motion for appointment of counsel 
is denied.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1993). 
                                                 
2
  The Agreement, which was reached through the grievance process, provided that 
Sauchelli would be removed from the Postal Service if he violated any Postal Service rule 
or regulation during a two-year period.  His grievance regarding the final notice of 
removal was resolved by a finding that his removal for violation of the Last Chance 
Agreement was for just cause. 
